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INTRODUCTION: BACK TO SQUARE ONE
About ten years ago, I decided to study both the functional immunity
of state officials from foreign jurisdiction and its exceptions in depth. I
operated from a basic assumption commonly made in public international
law manuals: there exists a general customary rule granting all state
officials exercising their official functions immunity ratione materiae from
the jurisdiction of foreign states. However, I soon realized that a step
backward was necessary. An incredible magnitude and variety of
documents, elements of state practice, and national and international case
law called that assumption into question.
This Article returns to square one with the intention of clarifying some
possible misconceptions about the notion and the scope of immunity
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ratione materiae. First, it spells out doubts about the very existence of a
general customary rule granting functional immunity from foreign
jurisdiction to all state officials exercising their official functions. It
advances the position that national courts may exercise criminal
jurisdiction over foreign officials suspected of international crimes under
existing rules—no exception is needed to justify the practice.
It is generally acknowledged that functional immunity from the
jurisdiction of foreign states accrues to all state officials for activities
performed in the exercise of their official functions, and that this immunity
survives the end of office. As International Law Commission (ILC)
Rapporteur Concepción Escobar Hernández explained:
[T]he basic characteristics of immunity ratione materiae can be
identified as follows: (a) It is granted to all state officials; (b) It is
granted only in respect of acts that can be characterized as “acts
performed in an official capacity”; and (c) It is not time-limited since
immunity ratione materiae continues even after the person who enjoys
such immunity is no longer an official.1

A second basic assumption, also widely shared, is a corollary to the
first: functional immunity attaches only to official activities carried out by
state officials on behalf of their state. Hence, in principle, activities must be
attributable to the state itself and not to the individual.2 Accordingly,
functional immunity is conceived of not as procedural, but as a substantive
obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction over state officials by foreign courts.
For the same reason, many authors contend that functional immunity

1. Concepción Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur on the Immunity of State Officials from
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction), Third Rep. on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal
Jurisdiction, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/673 (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter Escobar Hernández, Third Rep.].
Hernández also highlighted that these three elements reflect definitions given by the doctrine and the
jurisprudence. Id.
2. HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 353 (2002) (“A suit against an individual
identified with and acting on behalf of a foreign state is the practical equivalent of a suit against the
sovereign authority itself. To allow a suit against such persons so acting would allow the litigant
indirectly to circumvent the immunity accorded to the state which they represent.”); HANS KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (1952) (“Since a state manifests its legal existence only
through acts performed by human beings in their capacity as organs of the state, that is to say, through
acts of state, the principle that no state has jurisdiction over another state must be interpreted to mean
that a state must not exercise jurisdiction through its own courts over acts of another state unless the
other state consents. Hence the principle applies not only in case a state as such is sued in a court of
another state, but also in case an individual is the defendant or the accused and the civil or criminal
delict for which the individual is prosecuted has the character of an act of state. Then the delict is to be
imputed to the state, not to the individual . . . .”).
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accrues to all state officials and, at least in principle, covers all of their
“official” acts.3
The ILC Rapporteur has a different view. In her Third and Fourth
Reports, she explains that for purposes of applying functional immunity,
attribution of a state official’s conduct to his or her state is not sufficient;
the governmental or sovereign nature of the functions carried out must also
be taken into account.4 However, most scholars, including the ILC
Rapporteur, agree that the ultimate reason for granting functional immunity
to a state official is respect for the sovereignty of other states, enshrined in
the principle par in parem non habet imperium.5 Section I focuses on
challenging the existence of a customary international rule granting
functional immunity to all state officials. Section II analyzes the rationale
for functional immunities rules provided by treaties, and Section III dwells
on the existence of an exception for international crimes.
I. IS THERE A GENERAL CUSTOMARY RULE GRANTING
FUNCTIONAL IMMUNITY TO ALL STATE OFFICIALS?
Beginning at square one requires questioning the very existence of a
general rule of customary international law providing that all state officials
performing official acts are immune from the criminal jurisdiction of
foreign states.6 Various elements of state practice—mainly domestic case
law—provide little evidence of such a general rule. There are, to the
contrary, many cases in which national courts exercised their criminal
jurisdiction over foreign officials performing official acts (or were only
prevented from doing so because there was a treaty provision granting
functional immunity to a specific class of state officials or because the

3. GEORG DAHM, 1 VŐLKERRECHT 225, 237, 303–05, 338–39 (1958); Michael Akehust,
Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 145, 241 (1972–73); Michael Bothe, Die
strafrechliche Immunität fremder Staatsorgane, 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [ZAÖRV] [HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L.] 246, 251 (1971).
4. See Escobar Hernández, Third Rep., supra note 1, ¶ 146; Concepción Escobar Hernández
(Special Rapporteur on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction), Fourth
Rep. on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, ¶ 118, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/686 (May 29, 2015) [hereinafter Escobar Hernández, Fourth Rep.].
5. Escobar Hernández, Fourth Rep., supra note 4, ¶ 118 ( “Since immunity ratione materiae is
intended to ensure respect for the principle of the sovereign equality of states, embodied in the maxim
par in parem non habet imperium, the acts covered by such immunity must also have a link to the
sovereignty that, ultimately, is intended to be safeguarded. That link, which cannot be merely formal, is
reflected in the requirement that the act performed in an official capacity cannot be only an act
attributable to the state and performed on behalf of the state, but must also be a manifestation of
sovereignty, constituting a form of exercise of elements of the governmental authority.”)
6. I will confine myself to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, with a few references to civil
jurisdiction where needed.
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officials also enjoyed personal or diplomatic immunity). It is impossible to
provide an exhaustive overview of existing practice,7 but a few examples
suffice to highlight the persistent uncertainties.
A. Controversial Cases
There are several cases in which national courts have exercised
criminal jurisdiction over foreign state officials for carrying out activities
unauthorized by the forum state on its territory. I will discuss two of the
most well-known. The first, known as the McLeod case, is frequently cited
as demonstrating the existence of the general rule that all state officials
performing official acts are immune from the criminal jurisdiction of
foreign states because of the positions taken by both governments involved
in the dispute.8
British Officer Alexander McLeod was suspected of involvement in
the arson of the steamer Caroline in 1837.9 In 1840, McLeod, while on a
trip to New York, was arrested and charged with arson and the murder of
Caroline crewmember Amos Durfee.10 The British Government assumed
responsibility for his acts and invoked immunity from criminal process.
The British asserted that because McLeod had acted in his official capacity,
the United States could not proceed against him. But the American judges

7. See INT’L LAW COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2016) (all ILC Reports
are published on this website).
8. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 110–13 (2d ed. 2005). Cassese traces the
first enunciation of the general rule back to the McLeod case and quotes, as recent evidence of its
existence, the position expressed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) Appeals Chamber in Blaškić: “[C]ustomary international law protects the internal organization
of each sovereign state: it leaves it to each sovereign state to determine its internal structure and in
particular to designate the individuals acting as state agents or organs. Each sovereign state has the right
to issue instructions to its organs, both those operating at the internal level and those operating in the
field of international relations, and also to provide for sanctions or other remedies in case of noncompliance with those instructions. The corollary of this exclusive power is that each state is entitled to
claim that acts or transactions performed by one of its organs in its official capacity be attributed to the
state, so that the individual organ may not be held accountable for those acts or transactions. The
general rule under discussion is well established in international law and is based on the sovereign
equality of states (par in parem non habet imperium).” Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT95-14-AR, Judgment, ¶¶ 41–42 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997)).
9. People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). See Supremacy of Territorial
Sovereign, Governmental Acts, 2 MOORE’S DIGEST, ch. 6, §179, at 24–30 (summarizing the McLeod
case); see also Robert Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82–99 (1938)
(same).
10. McLeod, 25 Wend. at 485.
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nonetheless declared themselves competent.11 Ultimately, McLeod was
acquitted.12
A more recent case frequently quoted as evidence of the existence of
the general rule on functional immunity is the Rainbow Warrior case. The
Rainbow Warrior (a Greenpeace vessel) was lying in Auckland harbor
when, on July 10, 1985, an explosion sunk the ship. The Dutch-Portuguese
photographer Fernando Pereira died in the incident. France initially denied
any involvement; however, two agents of the French Directorate General of
External Security (DGSE), Major Mafart and Captain Prieur, were later
arrested in New Zealand in connection with the incident. France took
responsibility for the criminal acts committed by its secret agents and
invoked their immunity from criminal proceedings. Although the action
was met by opposition from the government and courts of France, both
agents were ultimately tried. On November 4, 1985, the agents pleaded
guilty to charges of manslaughter and willful damage to a ship by means of
an explosive, and were sentenced to ten years in prison.13
In both cases, the governments on whose behalf the state officials
acted claimed that the officials ought to enjoy functional immunity. These
statements are widely believed to evidence the customary rule that state
officials enjoy functional immunity.14 Indeed, some scholars emphasize
that cases like these—relating to activities carried out by foreign officials
on the territory of a forum state without its authorization or consent—are
precisely those in which an exception to that general rule ought to apply.15
However, this position and the two exemplary cases described above
are very difficult to reconcile with a notion of functional immunity

11. See id. at 490–98 (emphasizing the appropriateness of U.S. jurisdiction).
12. See id. at 515–16 (“[T]o hold the prisoner guilty of murder or any crime . . . would produce in
international law a revolution . . . .”).
13. The decision can be found in International Law Reports. R v. Mafart (Rainbow Warrior case)
[1985] NZHC 243, reprinted in 74 I.L.R. 241 (1994). The Rainbow Warriors Affair subsequently gave
rise to a mediation and an arbitration between France and New Zealand. E.g., generally, Gilbert Apollis,
Le règlement de l’affaire du ‘Rainbow Warrior’, 91 REVUE GÉNÉRAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 9–43 (1987); Jean Charpentier, L’affaire du Rainbow Warrior, 31 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 210–20 (1985); Jean Charpentier, L’affaire du Rainbow Warrior: le règlement
interétatique, 32 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 873–85 (1986); Jean Charpentier,
L’affaire du Rainbow Warrior: la sentence arbitrale du 30 Avril 1990 (Nouvelle Zélande c. France), 36
ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 395–407 (1990); Michael Pugh, Legal Aspects of the
Rainbow Warrior Affair, 36 INT’L & COMP. L. Q., 665–69 (1987); J. Scott Davidson, The Rainbow
Warrior Arbitration Concerning the Treatment of the French Agents Mafart and Prieur, 40 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 446–57 (1991).
14. The fact that criminal jurisdiction was nonetheless exercised over McLeod, Prieur and Mafart
is deemed consistent with the existence of such a general rule.
15. See supra notes 1, 2, and 8 and accompanying text.
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conceived in terms of attributing state officials’ activities to the state itself,
as was done by Roman Kolodkin, the first ILC Rapporteur, and many other
scholars.16 Assuming that the application of functional immunity turns on
attribution,17 it seems activities carried out without the consent of the forum
state should be attributed to the state on whose behalf the official was
acting. Indeed, this seems all the more appropriate where the state to which
the indicted official belongs explicitly acknowledges that the official acted
on its behalf and assumes responsibility for his or her activities.
There are also a few cases concerning the exercise of foreign
jurisdiction over state officials performing activities authorized by the
forum state.18 Practice is scant for an obvious reason: state officials who
normally reside abroad, such as consular agents or military forces stationed
in foreign countries, are covered by specific treaty rules. In those cases, if
the issue of functional immunity arises, there is no need to resort to a
general customary rule.19
Therefore, it is important to examine existing treaty rules and
jurisprudence concerning some specific categories of state officials, in

16. Int’l Law Comm’n, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction,
Memorandum by the Secretariat, ¶¶ 159–60, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/596 (Mar. 31, 2008); Roman
Anatolevich Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal
Jurisdiction), Second Rep. on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 29–31,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631 (June 10, 2010).
17. As the ICJ has ruled in the Djibouti case: “The state which seeks to claim immunity for one of
its state organs is expected to notify the authorities of the other state concerned. This would allow the
court of the forum state to ensure that it does not fail to respect any entitlement to immunity and might
thereby engage the responsibility of that state. Further, the state notifying a foreign court that judicial
process should not proceed, for reasons of immunity, against its state organs, is assuming responsibility
for any internationally wrongful act in issue committed by such organs.” Certain Questions of Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 177, ¶ 196 (June 4).
18. See, e.g., Kovtunenko v. U Law Yone, Sup. Ct., Mar. 1, 1960 (Burma), reprinted in 31 I.L.R.
259, 265 (1994) (“If the applicant is concerned at all in the publication of the Bulletin, including the
item to which exception has been taken, his act in publishing it might be an official act authorised by
his Government and within the scope of his official duties, as the applicant’s learned counsel contends.
But that in itself could not be a defence in law in this country. However, it is a factor to be taken into
consideration if Executive intervention is sought.”).
19. See the interesting reflections by Oppenheim on cases where no treaty rule is available:
“Occasionally a state sends to the territory of another agents to represent it in regard to some public
service or business carried on by it—for instance, the management of a state railway or a state tobacco
industry or even a Trade Delegation for the purpose of general trading. Agents of this kind do not
possess diplomatic character or immunities, and are fully subject to the jurisdiction of the state in whose
territory they are. They only differ from their fellow-nationals in the respect that, being government
agents, both prudence and international courtesy demand that as far as possible special consideration
should be shown by the local authorities to them and to premises occupied by them for official
purposes. No distinct rules have been developed with regard to their position, but in some cases the
matter is dealt with by agreement between the two states.” L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
TREATISE 860–61 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1958) (emphasis added).
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order to verify whether the rules contained therein and applied in domestic
courts provide for immunity ratione materiae from foreign criminal
jurisdiction and under which conditions. A few tentative conclusions may
then be drawn regarding the existence of a customary rule.
B. Visiting Armed Forces
In assessing treaty rules, military forces stationed on foreign territory,
usually categorized as beneficiaries of immunity ratione materiae, are a
relevant case study. The stationing of military troops on foreign territory,
both on a permanent and temporary basis, is governed by bilateral or
multilateral treaties. As early as World War I, the Allied Powers were
creating such bilateral agreements. These agreements usually contained
provisions giving the sending state exclusive jurisdiction over its forces.20
However, the provisions were not designed as immunity rules, but as rules
on the allocation of jurisdictional competencies between states. In these
agreements, there is no reference to a general rule on immunity ratione
materiae accruing to state officials, nor is there mention of an exemption
from criminal jurisdiction for members of armed forces for acts performed
in their official capacity.21
During World War II, many agreements regulating the presence of
armed troops on foreign territories were concluded among the Allied
Powers. As for criminal jurisdiction, the rules were diverse: some
agreements provided for exclusive jurisdiction of the sending state while
others provided for concurrent jurisdiction between the sending and the
host state.22 Once again, these rules were clearly not envisaged as immunity
rules. It is also vital to note that some of these agreements provided for the

20. For instance, one agreement recognized: “[L]a juridiction exclusive des tribunaux . . . [des]
armées d’opérations respectives à l’égard des personnes appartenant à ces armeés, quels que soient le
territoire où elles se trouvent et la nationalité des inculpés.” Declaration Franco-Belge relative à la
juridiction pénale militaire [French-Belgian Declaration], Fr.-Belg., Jan. 29, 1916, in Edouard Clunet,
43 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 726, 726–27 (1916) (Fr.).
21. The exchange of diplomatic notes between governments and the position taken by domestic
courts seem to show exemption from jurisdiction exclusively depended on treaty rules. With regard to
the negotiation of an agreement between the U.S. and the U.K., Barton observes: “There is no evidence
in the negotiations for the contention that the provision in the proposed agreement recognizing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the service courts of one contracting party over its armed forces in the territory
of the other was thought to consecrate any universally accepted principle of international law.” G. P.
Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 186, 192–
93 (1950).
22. See id. at 197–205 (summarizing the different rules in the context of Word War II). For a
contrary interpretation, see Archibald King, Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 36 AM.
J. INT’L L. 539 (1942) and Archibald King, Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction over
Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (1946).
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right of the territorial state to exercise jurisdiction over civilian retinue of
foreign armed forces deployed on its territory.23
After World War II, multilateral agreements, now commonly referred
to as status of forces agreements (SOFAs), became prevalent. Especially
relevant is the NATO SOFA, the 1951 London Agreement between the
states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their
Forces.24 Article VII allows the courts of the host state to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over foreign military and civilian officers for acts performed on
the territory of the host state in violation of its domestic law.25 More
specifically, according to Article VII, paragraph 3, when there is concurrent
jurisdiction, the sending state maintains primary (but not exclusive)
jurisdiction over “offences arising out of any act or omission done in the
performance of official duty.”26 Criminal jurisdiction of the host state is not
excluded, and Article VII was clearly not drafted as an immunity rule, but
as a rule allocating jurisdiction between the sending and the host state. In
practice, national courts determine the official character of the acts and
their decisions may not necessarily be consistent with the opinion of
sending states.27

23. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Immunity from Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters of Members
of the United States Forces in Egypt, U.S.-Egypt, Mar. 2, 1943, 57 Stat. 1197 (providing for such a
right).
24. Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their
Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter NATO SOFA].
25. Id. art. VII, ¶¶ 1–2 (“Subject to the provisions of this Article, (a) the military authorities of the
sending state shall have the right to exercise within the receiving state all criminal and disciplinary
jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending state over all persons subject to the military
law of that state; (b) The authorities of the receiving state shall have jurisdiction over the members of a
force or civilian component and their dependants with respect to offences committed within the territory
of the receiving state and punishable by the law of that state. (2) (a) The military authorities of the
sending state shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military
law of that state with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the
law of the sending state, but not by the law of the receiving state. (b) The authorities of the receiving
state shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian
component and their dependents with respect to offences, including offences relating to the security of
that state, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending state. (c) For the purposes of this
paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a security offence against a state shall include (i) treason
against the state; (ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of that state,
or secrets relating to the national defence of that state.”).
26. Id. art. VII, ¶ 3(a)(ii).
27. Richard R. Baxter, Criminal Jurisdiction in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 7 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 72, 78–79 (1958) (“The proper authority to determine whether an act was committed in the
performance of official duties was at one time quite clear, but subsequent events have made it less so.
According to the travaux préparatoires of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, the certificate of the
military authorities of the sending state would be taken as determinative of that fact. Notwithstanding
this clear history, the Legal Adviser to the Department of state testified to the Foreign Relations
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The status of UN peacekeeping troops and their presence in foreign
territory is regulated by SOFAs as well. According to the Model UN
SOFA, drafted in 1990, military personnel employed in UN peacekeeping
forces are under the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the sending state,28
and no distinction is made between acts performed in an official or in a
private capacity.29
In summary, it does not seem possible to detect the existence of a
customary rule bestowing immunity ratione materiae on members of
military troops stationed abroad or visiting armed forces.30 There are
instead specific treaty rules concerning the exercise of foreign jurisdiction
over visiting military troops that grant primary (but not exclusive)
jurisdiction of the sending state over acts performed by those troops in an
official capacity. Moreover, there is no unanimous opinion on which
authority is entitled to determine the official nature of the acts or on the
criteria to be used to identify these acts. Nor does one find in SOFAs
references to the existence of a general customary rule.
C. Consular Agents
The category of consular agents also deserves attention. In the past,
consular agents’ status and treatment was regulated using bilateral
agreements. The vast majority of these treaties contained functional
immunity clauses. These rules provided that immunity ratione materiae
should cover only acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.

Committee of the United States Senate that it rested with the courts of the receiving state to review any
such certificate and reach its own conclusions about the question.”).
28. U.N. Secretary-General, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping
Operations in All their Aspects, ¶ 47(b), U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990) (“Military members of the
military component of the United Nations peace-keeping operation shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of their respective participating states in respect of any criminal offenses which may be
committed by them in [host country/territory.”).
29. See, e.g., UN Secretary-General, Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of
International Humanitarian Law, § 4, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999) (“In case of
violations of international humanitarian law, members of the military personnel of a United Nations
force are subject to prosecution in their national courts.”).
30. See, e.g., Talitha Vassalli di Dachenhausen, L’Art. VII Della Convenzione di Londra Sulle
Forze Militari Della NATO e il Giudice Penale Italiano, 16 COMUNICAZIONI E STUDI 489 (1980),
passim. For comments on a more recent incident, see Annalisa Ciampi, Compensating Victims of the
Cermis Cable Car Accident Under NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 9 ITAL. Y.B. INT’L L. 113 (1999)
(discussing the liability settlement under NATO SOFA of a U.S. military training accident which
caused the death of 20 tourists in Cermis, Italy in February 1998), passim.
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The text of these agreements was generally extremely clear and
restrictive. For instance, Article 13 of the Anglo-Italian Convention of
1954 reads:
A consular officer or employee shall not be liable, in proceedings in the
courts of the receiving state, in respect of acts performed in his official
capacity, falling within the functions of a consular officer under
international law as recognised in the territory, unless the sending state
requests or assents to the proceedings through its diplomatic
representative.”31

To benefit from immunity under the Convention the consular officer must
have acted both in an official capacity and within the limits of his or her
competencies according to international law.32 The language of the PanAmerican Consular Convention of 1928 is clear: “Consuls are not subject
to local jurisdiction for acts done in their official character and within the
scope of their authority.”33
Today, this issue is covered by Article 43 of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, which states: “Consular officers and consular
employees shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or
administrative authorities of the receiving state in respect of acts performed
in the exercise of consular functions.”34 This Article is viewed as
corresponding to a rule of customary international law. It is interesting to
note that the preparatory works of the Consular Convention confirm that
immunity ratione materiae is strictly connected to the exercise of consular
functions. That indication is confirmed by the failed attempt to replace the
expression “consular functions” with the more generic “official
functions.”35 Indeed, interpretation given to this rule seems to confirm its
restrictive scope. The 1978 aide-mémorie of the United States State
Department states that national courts shall refrain from exercising

31. Consular Convention (With Two Protocols of Signature and Exchange of Notes) art. 13,
U.K.-It., Jun. 1, 1954, 403 U.N.T.S. 275 (emphasis added).
32. See LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 483–84 (2d ed., 1991) (discussing the
above, and listing examples such as the Italian-French Convention of 1955 and the Anglo-Norwegian
Convention of 1951).
33. Convention between the United States of America and Other American Republics Relating to
the Duties, Rights, Prerogatives and Immunities of Consular Agents art. 16, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat.
1976, 1979; see also GREEN H. HACKWORTH, IV DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 765 (1940).
34. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 43, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261.
35. See generally U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Official Records – Volume I: Summary
Records of Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the First and Second Committees, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/16 (Vol. I) (1963) (discussing an amendment proposed by the Brazilian delegation).
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jurisdiction over foreign consular agents in cases where “it is established
that the activity giving rise to the judicial or administrative proceeding was
performed in an official capacity and in pursuit of the exercise of accepted
consular functions.”36
Criminal case law confirms a restrictive application of the immunity
ratione materiae rule to consular agents. Early twentieth century cases
already exist on this topic.37 Bigelow v. Zizianoff,38 before the Paris Court
of Appeals, is very interesting because the judges recognized functional
immunity only for those contested acts performed within the regular
exercise of consular functions.39
A few recent cases confirm that the recognition of functional
immunity depends on the regular performance of consular functions. A
case in point is Rissmann.40 Mr. Rissmann was the Consul of the Federal
Republic of Germany in Genoa, Italy.41 He was accused of releasing a
passport to a minor with dual nationality so that the child could leave the
country with the child’s father, notwithstanding that the Italian courts had
granted custody of the child to the Italian mother.42 The Italian judges
eventually recognized immunity, since they deemed issuing passports a
typical consular function.43 Some scholars advocate for an even more
restrictive interpretation. Condorelli, for instance, claims that Rissman

36. LEE, supra note 32, at 495 (emphasis added) (quoting Consular Officers and Consulates,
“Official Acts”, 1978 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 4, §2 at 629–
30).
37. See, e.g., Cass. Pen., 19 Aprile 1933, Rivista di diritto internazionale 1933, 25, 233 (It.) [In re
Vuhotich], reprinted in 7 I.L.R. 392 (1994).
38. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, crim., Jan. 28, 1928, Gaz. Pal. 1928, 1,
726 (Fr.), reprinted in 4 I.L.R. 384 (1932).
39. Id. Acts performed in an official capacity, but not falling under consular functions were
considered by the court as private acts: “Whereas it is not possible to consider that Bigelow, in the
hypothesis that the act to be established, has performed an official act in revealing the third persons the
reasons why he refused to visa the passport of Princess Zizianoff; indeed, he would not be within the
limits of these functions in making known why he had taken this decision, and especially so because in
addressing journalists, he could not but know that his remarks would be reproduced in the press and
would, in consequence, be likely to give rise to acts contrary to French laws; that he has thus acted, not
as a consul, but as a private person on his own responsibility and, consequently, not protected by
immunity by reason of official acts and he has no legal ground to ask the court to declare itself
incompetent.” Tribunal correctionnel [criminal court] Seine, Apr. 5, 1927, Gaz. Pal. 1927, 2, 18 (Fr.)
[Zizianoff v. Kahn], reprinted in 21 AM. J. INT’L L. 811, 813 (1927). For an example from the U.S., see
Arcaya v. Páez, 145 F. Supp. 464, 466–67 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff’d 244 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding
that the immunity accorded to consuls extended only to acts performed in the course of their consular
duties).
40. Re Rissmann, Trib. di Genova, 6 maggio 1970 (It.), reprinted in 71 I.L.R. 577 (1994).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Re Rissmann, Cass., 28 febbraio 1972 (It.), reprinted in 71 I.L.R. 577 (1994).

FRULLI FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE)

490

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

7/9/2016 11:09 PM

Vol 26:479

acted against a judgment by an Italian judge and thus “outside the limits of
his functions.”44
A similar case is State of Indiana v. Ström.45 The Swedish Consul in
Chicago was accused of having issued a passport to a Swedish national
indicted for murder. Ström was able to benefit from immunity from
criminal jurisdiction because the judges reasoned that he was acting in
exercise of consular functions envisaged in the Vienna Convention.46
In sum, immunity from criminal jurisdiction is granted to consular
agents only for acts performed in the regular exercise of the consular
functions enumerated in the Vienna Convention. For acts not enlisted,
interested states might reach an agreement,47 but eventually domestic
judges decide at their own discretion on the application of the rule.
D. High-Ranking State Officials
It is also important to verify whether and to what extent high-ranking
state officials, particularly former heads of state, enjoy functional immunity
from foreign criminal jurisdiction. If one leaves aside cases concerning
high-ranking state officials in office, to whom immunity ratione personae
from foreign jurisdiction accrues, and cases concerning high-ranking state
officials suspected of international crimes, practice and case law are very
limited. The paucity of practice is not surprising. High-ranking officials
usually perform their functions on the territory of their state and only
occasionally abroad, typically in the context of official visits or missions.
In the case of activities performed by a high-ranking state official on
his or her territory, a right for foreign courts to exercise their criminal
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. Even if jurisdiction were established, the
forum state may not be able to hold in absentia trials. There may be other
rules preventing the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, such as the act of
state doctrine or forum non conveniens. In addition, activities performed by
a high-ranking state official on foreign territory do not commonly involve a
violation of the criminal law of the forum state. In any case, heads of state,
44. Luigi Condorelli, Judicial Decisions: Consular Immunity, 2 ITAL. Y.B. INT’L L. 305, 341
(1976) (concluding that “the consul who assists a minor without respecting the laws of the receiving
state acts outside the limits of his proper functions; and his action cannot be covered by functional
immunity”).
45. Indiana v. Ström, No. 45G03-8801-CF-00010 (Ind. Super. Ct. Lake Cnty. Sept. 30, 1988).
For another more recent case, see L. v. The Crown [1977] NZSC, reprinted in 68 I.L.R. 175 (1994).
46. Indiana v. Ström, No. 45G03-8801-CF-00010 (Ind. Super. Ct. Lake Cnty. Sept. 30, 1988). For
detailed analysis see LEE, supra note 32, at 501–04.
47. According to Lee, “in the interest of promoting friendly relations and avoiding retaliations, a
country may well let go a consul charged with committing a crime – ostensibly on legal grounds but in
reality on political or policy considerations.” LEE, supra note 32, at 503–04.
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heads of government, and foreign ministers may not be prosecuted while in
office because of personal immunity and inviolability; once they relinquish
their position other obstacles may emerge, such as the ones mentioned just
above. However, the scantiness of cases is not related to the existence of a
customary rule on functional immunity of state officials from foreign
jurisdiction.
One of the cases most frequently cited by supporters of the existence
of a customary rule is the extradition case against Jimenez, the former Head
of State of Venezuela.48 Jimenez was extradited to his country by the
United States Supreme Court for crimes committed on his territory.49 The
Court reasoned that these offenses could not fall within his official
functions, but were instead “common crimes committed by the Chief of
State done in violation of his position and not in pursuance of it.”50
However, a closer look reveals that the justices qualified the acts as
common crimes with a view to excluding the act of state doctrine, not a
functional immunity rule. Additionally, the case is unique because
extradition was requested by Jimenez’s state of nationality, a very peculiar
situation.51
In other cases, suggestions of immunity by governments have
influenced domestic court decisions on immunity of high-ranking state
officials. In these cases, political considerations—as opposed to the
application of a general function immunity rule—were the driving force
behind judicial restraint. If there were a general customary rule of
functional immunity applicable to all state officials acting in their official
capacity, suggestions of immunity would be unnecessary. U.S. case law,
for instance, is very much conditioned by political considerations and is
quite contradictory. In United States v. Noriega,52 for example, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied immunity to
Manuel Noriega, former head of State of Panama, suspected of drugtrafficking, because he was never officially recognized by the U.S.

48. Jiminez v. U.S. District Court, 84 S. Ct. 14 (1963).
49. Id. at 16–17 (noting that the claim for extradition was based on a treaty between the U.S. and
Venezuela mandating extradition in cases of embezzlement by public officers).
50. Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 558 (5th Cir. 1962), aff’d sub nom. Jiminez v. U.S.
District Court, 84 S. Ct. 14 (1963).
51. The issue also came up before Swiss courts in the Affaire Marcos. See Marc Henzelin,
L’immunité pénale des chefs d’Etat en matière financière. Vers une exception pour les actes de pillage
de ressources et de corruption?, 12 REVUE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT EUROPEEN
179, 192–96 (2002).
52. 746 F. Supp 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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government as the legitimate head of State of Panama.53 On the contrary, in
Lafontant v. Aristide,54 the Eastern District of New York held that JeanBertrand Aristide was entitled to absolute immunity (ratione personae)
even after he was overthrown by a military golpe, because he was
considered by the American government as the acting head of state of
Haiti.55
Finally, it is worth mentioning the Institut de Droit International (IDI)
resolution: Les immunités de juridiction et d’exécution du chef d’Etat et de
gouvernement en droit international, which was adopted in 2001 on the
basis of a study conducted by Rapporteur Joe Verhoeven.56 In the final
version of this resolution, former heads of states enjoy immunity from
criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction for acts that are, or relate to,
the exercise of official functions.57 It is interesting to note that the formula
chosen does not refer generally to official functions, but instead to acts
accomplished in the typical or regular exercise of head of state functions—
it is, therefore, highly restrictive.58
On the basis of such a scarce practice, it is difficult to reach firm
conclusions. Even assuming that a customary rule grants former heads of
state and other high-ranking state officials functional immunity from

53. See id. at 1519 n.11 (noting that “there is ample doubt whether head of state immunity
extends to private or criminal acts in violation of U.S. law. . . . Criminal activities such as the narcotics
trafficking with which Defendant is charged can hardly be considered official acts or governmental
duties which promote a sovereign state’s interests, especially where, as here, the activity was allegedly
undertaken for the sole personal benefit of the foreign leader”). The court concluded that “[s]ince the
United States has never recognized General Noriega as Panama’s head of state, he has no claim to head
of state immunity.” Id. at 1521. The act of state doctrine was rejected as well. Id. at 1521–23.
54. 844 F. Supp 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Joseph W. Dellapenna, Lafontant v. Aristide, 88
AM. J. INT’L L. 526, 528–32 (1994).
55. In Lafontant, the U.S. Department of Justice submitted a suggested immunity letter which did
not mention any obligation to apply immunity rules: “The United States has an interest and concern in
this action against President Aristide insofar as the action involves the question of immunity from the
Court’s jurisdiction of the head-of-state of a friendly foreign state. The United States’ interest arises
from a determination by the Executive Branch of the Government of the United States, in the
implementation of its foreign policy and in the conduct of its international relations, that permitting this
action to proceed against President Aristide would be incompatible with the United States’ foreign
policy interests.” 844 F. Supp at 131.
56. JOE VERHOEVEN (RAPPORTEUR), L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, LES IMMUNITÉS DE
JURIDICTION ET D’EXÉCUTION DU CHEF D’ETAT ET DE GOUVERNEMENT EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL
(2001), http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiF/resolutionsF/2001_van_02_fr.PDF. Note that the 2001
Resolution is divided into two sections: one dealing with heads of state in office and one dealing with
former heads of state.
57. In the official French version it is even clearer: “en raison d’actes qu’il a accomplis durant ses
fonctions et qui participaient de leur exercice.” Id. art. 13 (emphasis added).
58. It is expressly ruled out that a former head of state may benefit from functional immunity
when suspected of having committed an international crime. Id.
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foreign criminal jurisdiction, it has to be understood in a strictly functionsrelated perspective. In other words, such a rule would work like the rules
on personal immunities accruing to high-ranking state officials.
E. Some Tentative Conclusions
State practice and jurisprudence—particularly domestic case law—
demonstrate that the existence of a general rule granting all state officials
acting in their official capacities ratione materiae immunity from the
jurisdiction of foreign states should not be taken for granted. These sources
also invite the conclusion that an alternative general rule exists: domestic
courts may exercise criminal jurisdiction over foreign state officials unless
otherwise specified by a specific treaty rule.
ILC Rapporteur Escobar Hernández is undertaking a comprehensive
analysis of this question and, if I am not mistaken, shares some of my
doubts about the existence of a customary rule granting functional
immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction to all state officials. In her
Fourth Report, released in June 2015, the Rapporteur acknowledged that:
The responses of national courts to the question of immunity have
varied; it cannot be concluded from the judicial decisions analysed that a
consistent pattern has been uniformly followed. On the contrary, such
decisions are based on different legal approaches and reasoning, in
which national courts have taken into account the defendant’s status as a
state official, the nature of the acts for which immunity is invoked and,
in some cases, the position taken by the government authorities of the
forum state or the official’s state.59

More specifically, Escobar Hernández is analyzing case law and practice in
order to determine whether it is possible to set out criteria for identifying
state officials for immunity purposes and for determining when state
officials are in fact carrying out official activities. Her provisional
conclusion is that the inquiries into whether an individual is a state official
and whether his or her acts were carried out in an official capacity should
be conducted on a case-by-case basis60—both conditions have to be
fulfilled for any rule on functional immunity to apply.61

59. Escobar Hernández, Fourth Rep., supra note 4, ¶ 51.
60. “In short, the existence of a connection between the beneficiary of immunity ratione materiae
and the state should be taken to mean that the person in question is in a position to perform acts that
involve the exercise of governmental authority. Whether a specific act performed by an official benefits
from that immunity or not would depend on the existence or non-existence of the two normative
elements of such immunity, namely whether the act in question can be deemed an ‘act performed in an

FRULLI FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE)

494

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

7/9/2016 11:09 PM

Vol 26:479

Escobar Hernández’s finding that the definition of state official for
purposes of invoking immunity ratione materiae does not coincide with the
broad definition of state organ given by the ILC in the 2001 Articles on
State Responsibility is a great step forward.62 The category of state officials
who fulfill the functional immunity criteria is indeed smaller than the
category of individuals whose official or governmental acts may be
attributed to the states on which behalf they acted. In other words, an
individual will not necessarily benefit from immunity rationae materiae
every time his or her conduct is attributable to the state on whose behalf the
official acted.
But most scholars and lawyers arguing in favor of the existence of a
customary rule on functional immunity have concluded that such a rule is a
substantive obstacle preventing the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
states’ officials. Since the individual acting on behalf of the state cannot be
held responsible for his acts, which must be attributed to the state itself,
immunity ratione materiae would simply be a mechanism for diverting
responsibility to the state.63 This was the point of view prevailing in the
official capacity’, and whether said act was performed by the person at a time when he or she was an
official of the state.” Escobar Hernández, Third Rep., supra note 1, ¶ 146.
61. Id. ¶¶ 111–12 (“111. On the basis of the foregoing study of the practice, a number of
conclusions can be drawn for determining the criteria for identifying what constitutes an official for the
purposes of the draft articles on immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction, namely: (a) The official
has a connection with the state. This connection can take several forms (constitutional, statutory or
contractual) and can be temporary or permanent. The connection can be de jure or de facto; (b) The
official acts internationally as a representative of the state or performs official functions both
internationally and internally; (c) The official exercises elements of governmental authority, acting on
behalf of the state. The elements of governmental authority include executive, legislative and judicial
functions. 112. These identifying criteria apply both to those state officials who enjoy immunity ratione
personae (Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs) and to those who
enjoy immunity ratione materiae (all other officials). The criteria in question, however, are especially
relevant in the case of immunity ratione materiae because it is not possible to enumerate explicitly the
categories of persons to whom it applies. In order, then, to identify a given person as an official, it must
be determined on a case-by-case basis if all the criteria are met.”).
62. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp.
No. 10, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (“The conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that
state under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other
functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the state, and whatever its character as an
organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the state. . . . An organ includes any person or
entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the state.”).
63. See generally Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International
Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts: A Rejoinder to Alexander Orakhelashvili, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L.
815 (2010); Pierre D’Argent, Immunity of State Officials and Obligation to Prosecute 7 (Universite
catholique de Louvain (UCL) CeDIE Working Paper No. 2013/04), https://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/
doc/ssh-cdie/documents/2013-04-PdArgent.pdf (“However, in contrast with what is required for
triggering immunity ratione personae, the concept of ‘representatives of the state’ for the purpose of
immunity ratione materiae is not limited to persons specifically embodying or personifying it. Rather,
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ILC before Professor Escobar Hernández was appointed. According to the
study prepared by the Secretariat for the ILC on the subject of immunity of
state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction:
“[I]f immunity ratione materiae is viewed as an implication of the
principle that conduct adopted by a state organ in the discharge of his or
her functions is to be attributed to the state, there appear to be strong
reasons for aligning the immunity regime with the rules on attribution of
conduct for purposes of state responsibility” or at the very least “the
criteria for attribution of conduct in the context of state responsibility
might [] be a relevant source of inspiration in determining whether an act
is to be considered as ‘official’ or ‘private’ for purposes of that
immunity.”64

The first ILC Rapporteur, Roman Kolodkin, shared this opinion, and in
reports he confirmed that the attribution of conduct to the state according to
the rules enshrined in the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility serves to
determine whether immunity ratione materiae from foreign jurisdiction
should apply.65
However, I have just shown above that the application of functional
immunity does not turn solely on the attribution of official conduct to the
state. First, there is no general rule consistently applied every time a state
official is indicted before a foreign domestic court. In addition, domestic
courts do not turn to those rules when making decisions on functional
immunity; instead, they evaluate the circumstances on a case-by-case basis,
relying on the existence of a treaty rule and taking into account the nature
of the activities performed. True, establishing state responsibility depends
entirely on whether the relevant conduct may be attributed to the state on
which behalf an organ has acted. But where immunity ratione materiae is
concerned, attribution to a state is only a preliminary step that could trigger
the application of an existing rule (when there is one). Judges must then
verify whether the acts at issue are covered by that rule (assuming, again,
that one exists). These conclusions ultimately bring me to challenge the
second basic assumption mentioned in the Introduction: that functional
immunity attaches only to official activities carried out by state officials on
behalf of their state.

that concept encompasses all state organs within the meaning of Article 4 of the ILC Articles on state
responsibility, together with ‘all the natural persons who are authorized to represent the state in all its
manifestations’ to use the ILC comments on the UN 2004 Convention.”).
64. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 16, ¶ 156.
65. Kolodkin, supra note 16, ¶ 24.
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II. THE RATIONALE OF FUNCTIONAL IMMUNITY RULES
The ILC Rapporteur expounded the view that the rationale for
functional immunity is protecting state sovereignty, a position rooted in the
par in parem principle. Further reflection on the combination of this
corollary with the first basic assumption—and on the raison d’etre of
immunity ratione materiae rules (in cases where they do exist)—reinforces
doubts about the existence of a general rule on functional immunity
covering all state officials.
If one assumes that functional immunity exists to protect state
sovereignty then the temptation to move back to the first basic assumption
is strong. It seems self-evident that if protecting state sovereignty is the
purpose of ratione materiae rules, the only relevant factor is whether the
state has assumed responsibility for the actions of the officials invoking
functional immunity. The analysis is brought full circle, back to the
attribution rules. As we have seen, however, this conclusion is not
convincingly supported by state practice and case law.
And other elements, including waiver, do not fit in the puzzle. If the
general rule serves the purpose of attributing conduct to the state, then it
stands to reason that the state cannot discharge itself simply by waiving the
immunity of its official. State practice, however, reveals that states who
waived their officials’ functional immunity did so precisely to absolve
themselves of responsibility. However, these attempts cannot be successful
because the rules on attribution provide that ultra vires acts are also to be
attributed to the state. There are indeed cases where dual responsibility is
possible, as highlighted in the Reports of Rapporteur Escobar Hernández.
On one hand, there is the criminal liability of the individual (domestic or,
perhaps, international) and on the other hand, the international
responsibility of the state. State practice shows that in many cases domestic
courts exercised their criminal jurisdiction over foreign state officials
precisely because the possibility of dual attribution of a certain act was
considered: on the internal plane criminal responsibility could be attributed
to the state organ whereas on the international level responsibility accrues
to the state.66
However, another (and in my opinion more important) factor also
raises doubts about the wisdom of framing functional immunity in terms of
attribution. This factor calls into question the rationale usually linked with
immunity ratione materiae. If we take a close look at the treaty rules

66. See generally Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980). For additional
commentary, see generally Haley D. Collums, The Letelier Case: Foreign Sovereign Liability for Acts
of Political Assassination, 21 VA. J. INT’L L., 251 (1980–81).
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granting functional immunity to a specific category of state officials, the
underlying rationale seems to be “functional necessity” rather than the
sovereign equality of states.
The example of consular agents is a fitting one. One of the most
significant recent decisions is the 2012 judgment of the Italian Court of
Cassation in the Abu Omar case. There, the Court stated that the scope of
consular duties covered by functional immunity must be limited to
typically administrative duties performed in observance of the laws and
regulations of the territorial state.67 A vast jurisprudence, as I have
attempted to show above, supports a strictly functional interpretation of the
immunity rules of the Consular Convention.68 In other words, the rationale
underlying the functional immunity rule inserted in the Convention does
not seem to be protecting the sovereignty of the sending state irrespective
of whatever act may be accomplished by its consuls in their official
capacity. It lies instead in the efficient performance of consular functions,
the ne impediatur officium rationale, normally attached to personal
immunities granted to diplomatic agents and high-ranking state officials.
The same functional perspective is reflected in the 1961 Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, although diplomatic agents also enjoy personal
immunity from criminal jurisdiction, which covers all their acts (including
private acts) as long as they are in office.
In addition, there is another trend that may be identified in case law on
this matter: In a number of cases, officials’ immunity was not upheld
because they acted ultra vires, or outside the scope of functions covered by
the specific rules. In other words, there seems to be a tendency by domestic
courts to increasingly apply a strictly functions-related rationale to the
interpretation of functional immunity rules accruing to state officials.69
Both of these trends are recognized by the ILC Reports of Rapporteur
Escobar Hernández, but they did not lead the Rapporteur to draw radical
conclusions about the raison d’être of immunity ratione materiae. In my
opinion, the fact that immunity ratione materiae rules are applied in a very
restrictive manner shows that they have been interpreted as protecting the
activities performed by certain categories of state officials, not only (and I
would argue not primarily) the sovereignty of the state on which behalf the
organ acted.
67. Cass. Pen., sez. V., 29 novembre 2012, n. 46340, Giur. it. 2013, 930 (It.).
68. See supra Part I. C.
69. For an extended analysis of case law and practice related to diplomatic agents and other
categories of state officials, see MICAELA FRULLI, IMMUNITÀ E CRIMINI INTERNAZIONALI: L’ESERCIZIO
DELLA GIURISDIZIONE PENALE E CIVILE NEI CONFRONTI DEGLI ORGANI STATALI SOSPETTATI DI GRAVI
CRIMINI INTERNAZIONALI

(2007).
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In conclusion, the rationale underlying existing rules on functional
immunity does not differ profoundly from the motivation underlying
personal immunity rules. In the latter case, however, given the relevance of
activities performed by certain categories of state officials for a peaceful
conduct of interstate relations, immunity also covers private acts as long as
these officials remain in office.
III. CAN WE TALK ABOUT AN EXCEPTION FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES?
Assuming that the line of reasoning proposed above is correct, it is
easier to conclude that it possible to prosecute state officials in national
courts for international crimes. There is no need to find an exception to a
general rule. Instead, existing rules suffice to justify the prosecution of state
officials suspected of having committed international crimes.
In practice, there is rarely a functional immunity rule covering state
officials and there is often no bar to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
the territorial state. In cases where there is a treaty rule, it typically does not
cover international crimes. The main function of these rules is, as explained
above, safeguarding the efficient performance of specific functions (crucial
for interstate relations such as consular or diplomatic functions). Such
functions obviously cannot include the commission of international crimes,
which are inherently ultra vires acts. From this viewpoint, the
inapplicability of existing functional immunity rules before domestic courts
in case of allegations of international crimes would correspond to their
correct application and would not be an exception to those rules.
The argument equating crimes with ultra vires acts has sometimes
been misunderstood. Saying that grave crimes are ultra vires acts does not
mean that they are non-official acts or non-sovereign acts; they may well
be committed under the color of law. It simply means that grave crimes
cannot be included in functions legally entrusted to state officials and in
some cases covered by functional immunity rules. It also means,
incidentally, that the state may not be absolved from its responsibilities
because there are criminal proceedings against its officials.
This was also, I believe, the conclusion reached by Lady Hazel Fox in
her work as Rapporteur of the Institut de droit international (IDI) on the
topic “Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on
Behalf of the State in case of International Crimes.” She defined grave
crimes as acts that per se may not be included among those for which
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functional immunity may be invoked.70 This was more evident in the
previous versions of the Resolution proposed in 2009.71 But in the final
draft adopted by the IDI a more general formulation on this issue—
proposed by Giorgio Gaja—was chosen. Lady Fox’s position is consistent,
in my view, with the line of reasoning followed by Joe Verhoeven as
Rapporteur of the IDI on the topic of “Immunities from Jurisdiction and
Execution of Heads of State and of Government in International Law.” In
fact, the 2001 resolution mentioned above referred to immunity ratione
materiae as covering only acts which are performed in the exercise of
official functions and relate to the exercise thereof.72 In any case, that
resolution held that a former head of state may be prosecuted and tried
when the acts alleged constitute a crime under international law.
More generally, when dealing with immunity of state officials and
international crimes, it is particularly misleading to frame the issue as a
matter of exception, even for logical reasons. In the case of international
crimes, the dual attribution of conduct to the state and to the individual is
regulated by international rules, so that both kinds of responsibility arise at
the international level. The emerging of individual criminal responsibility
on the international plane renders possible a dual attribution at that level,
and on that account national courts may, and sometimes are obliged to,
prosecute those suspected of international crimes, irrespective of their
official position. International criminal responsibility for certain grave acts
may be adjudicated, since the early days, at the national level, and rules
establishing it would be meaningless if any kind of rule on functional
immunity could hamper their application. Needless to say, most serious
crimes are very seldom committed by private persons. National courts are
indeed the “natural judge” for these cases, and often the only viable option.
Not surprisingly, the cornerstone of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
system is complementarity and its best chance to be an efficient tribunal
rests on the will of states to prosecute at the national level.73
70. Hazel Fox (Rapporteur), Inst. of Int’l Law, Third Comm’n, Resolution on the Immunity from
Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the State in Cases of International
Crimes, art. I (2009), http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2009_naples_01_en.pdf.
71. For the previous versions of the Resolution and the travaux preparatoires of the Third
Commission of the IDI on this topic see Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international (Session de
Naples), Vol.73, 2009, Paris, Pedone, passim.
72. Joe Verhoeven (Rapporteur), Inst. of Int’l Law, Thirteenth Comm’n, Immunities from
Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government in International Law, art. 3 (2001),
http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2001_van_02_en.PDF.
73. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Bleich, Complementarity, 25 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 281 (1996–97).
The ICC may proceed with investigations only when Member States are unwilling or unable to
prosecute crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 17, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“Issues of admissibility: 1. Having regard to paragraph
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CONLUSION: A FEW THOUGHTS ON A MORE GENERAL LEVEL
The same conclusions, in my view, should be reached for functional
immunity from foreign civil proceedings. In civil law countries, where the
adhesion process (la constitution de partie civile) allows the victims to
apply for compensation in conjunction with the criminal proceedings, it
would be artificial if the immunity issue were resolved differently
depending on whether the complaint against the state official was filed
before a civil or a criminal court. In common law countries, where the two
proceedings are separate, the two courts may well resolve a given
immunity issue differently.
It is inconsistent to give a different solution to the immunity of state
officials depending on the nature of the court, and it is this incongruity that
brings us back to the question of attribution as the pivotal one around
which the issue of functional immunity is usually solved. If we abandon the
idea that functional immunity is a substantive obstacle to the exercise of
jurisdiction, then why should it be upheld before a civil court? Moreover, if
international crimes may not be covered by functional immunity rules, why
could the same acts fall under the reach of functional immunity in civil
proceedings?
A concrete example may better illustrate the negative consequences of
this separation. In the very well known case, Jones v. Ministry of Interior
Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) and
Others, the U.K. House of Lords held that both respondents, the
government of Saudi Arabia and its organ Colonel Abdul-Aziz, were
immune from the civil jurisdiction of English courts by virtue of the
10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The
case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been
investigated by a state which has jurisdiction over it and the state has decided not to prosecute the
person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state genuinely
to prosecute; (c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the
complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; (d) The case is not of
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. 2. In order to determine unwillingness in a
particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by
international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were
or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person
concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in
article 5; (b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; (c) The proceedings were not or are
not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner
which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 3. In
order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is unable to obtain the
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”).
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Sovereign Immunity Act (SIA).74 However, what would have happened if
Colonel Abdul-Aziz were prosecuted before a criminal tribunal? It would
have been assumed that he could not rely on his capacity as a state official
to render him exempt from jurisdiction because he was being accused of
acts of torture. This is, in fact, what happened in Pinochet,75 where the
House of Lords did not accept the plea of immunity of a former head of
state for alleged acts of torture and decided that it was possible to extradite
him to Spain.76 Therefore, if one shares the view that the immunity plea of
a state official should be treated differently depending on the civil or
criminal nature of the proceedings, there could hypothetically be a situation
where the very same organ is immune from a civil suit but not from
criminal jurisdiction on the same set of facts. This would create an
unacceptable contradiction, undermining access to justice and
compensation for the victims of the most serious international crimes.
Not surprisingly, some of the Lords in the appeal decision in Jones
drew attention to the incongruity of completely separating civil and
criminal proceedings in the case of torture. In a judgment subsequently
quashed by the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal had actually rejected
the immunity plea by Abdul-Aziz, pointing to the shortcomings of
separating civil and criminal courts for the purposes of applying functional
immunity.77 In the words of Lord Mance, “there is the obvious potential for
anomalies, if the international criminal jurisdiction which exists under the
Torture Convention is not matched by some wider parallel power to
adjudicate over civil claims.”78

74. Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC 270 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
75. R v. Bartle, ex Parte Pinochet (Pinochet I) [1998] UKHL 41, [2000] 1 AC 61 (HL) (appeal
taken from Eng.); R v. Bartle, ex Parte Pinochet (Pinochet II) [1999] UKHL 17, [2000] 1 AC 147 (HL)
(appeal taken from Eng.).
76. However, Lord Hutton and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers argued that if Pinochet were
sued for civil liability, he could have been declared immune from the jurisdiction of British Courts for
the very same acts. Pinochet II, 1 AC at 249 (Lord Hutton LJ), 279 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers
LJ).
77. Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1394 (appeal taken from QB High Ct. of Justice).
78. Id. [79] (Lord Mance LJ). Lord Mance continues: “[T]he prosecution of crime and the pursuit
of civil proceedings are in many jurisdictions (as Breyer, J. observed in Sosa) very closely associated.
In other jurisdictions like the English, Mr. Pannick’s absolute distinction seems incongruous in a
situation like that in Filartiga, if the alleged torturer was actually within and being prosecuted in the
jurisdiction pursuant to one or other of the provisions of article 5 of the Torture Convention. Despite the
criminal investigation and proceedings, in respect of which no immunity could be claimed, the victim(s)
of the alleged torture would be unable to pursue any civil claim.” Id.
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Under the definition of torture contained in Article 1 of the UN
Convention, acts of torture may be committed only by state officials.79
Assuming that the acts of every state official, even when they may be
classed as crimes of torture, must always be covered by the SIA or by
functional immunity in civil suits, is tantamount to saying that there is
never a chance for the victims of torture to obtain adequate compensation.
However, Article 14(1) of the Torture Convention provides that every state
must “ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation.”80
Therefore, granting functional immunity to state officials in civil suits
before foreign domestic courts thwarts the very purpose of the Convention.
A similar line of reasoning could apply, mutatis mutandis, to many other
international crimes committed by state officials. These considerations
raise the question of what is the real issue behind these inconsistencies. In
my opinion, behind the different attitude in criminal or civil proceedings in
the application of functional immunity of state organs suspected of
international crimes, there is a precise will not to make an exception—not
even to discuss one—to state immunity.
I conclude with a paradox: it has often been said, concerning the
criminal liability of individuals for the most serious crimes, that state
officials may not hide behind their states. They may not claim to have been
just a cog in the machine or to have obeyed to instructions given by others.
But if one follows the House of Lords’ line of reasoning in Jones and keeps
separate the question of functional immunity for crimes in civil
proceedings, one arrives at the conclusion that states may hide behind their
organs, because only the latter, at the end of the day, may be prosecuted
before a domestic criminal court or, where available, an international
criminal tribunal.

79. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“For the purposes of
this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”).
80. Id. art. 14(1).

